Dale L. Terry, Barbara H. Terry v. Price Municipal Corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
Dale L. Terry, Barbara H. Terry v. Price Municipal
Corporation : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joane Pappas White; attorney for respondent.
Duane R. Smith; Poole & Smith; attorneys for appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Dale L. Terry, Barbara H. Terry v. Price Municipal Corporation, No. 870445.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1775
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEB 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
89
 r.l7^^ DOCKET NO: 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THfe STATE OF UTAH 
'
T
*
W
"
V
'""
V
*
W
'
WAV
""*
WAW
"
W
*
V
'^  
DALE L. TERRY and 
BARBARA H. TERRY, Individuals 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
PRICE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation 
defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 870445 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court 
in and for Carbon County, Stat0 of Utah 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, presiding. 
Category No. 14b. 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Fifth Street Plaza 
475 East Main, Suite 1 
Price, Utah 84501 4885 South 900 East 
DIIANE R. SMITH, ESQ. 
Pocbe & Smith 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Prdwswood Plaza, Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
i n k 
MAR 3 1989 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DALE L. TERRY AND BARBARA H. 
TERRY, individuals 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs • 
PRICE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation 
Defendant-Respondent. 
qase No. 870445 
• * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
• * * * 
Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Carbon 
County, State of Utah, Honorable Boyd Bunnell, presiding. 
Category No. 14b. 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Fifth Street Plaza 
475 East Main, Suite 1 
Price, Utah 84501 
DUANE R. SMITH, ESQ. 
Poole & Smith 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Prowswood Plaza, Suite 306 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
JURISDICTION. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
9 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
IN EQUITY CASES IS THE 
"CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
STANDARD" 11 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
THE ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL AND SUCH A FINDING 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THE 
EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
AGAINST IT 12 
III. IN ARGUENDO, EVEN IF THE ELEMENTS 
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HAD BEEN 
PROVEN, THE FACTS OF THE CASE AT 
BAR DO NOT WARRANT AN EXCEPTION 
TO THE RULE THAT ESTOPPEL CANNOT 
BE ASSERTED AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITY 18 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS HAD TRESPASSED ON 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS-OF-WAY AND 
THAT A MONETARY AWARD OF DAMAGES 
FOR THE CEDAR HILLS DRIVE TRESPASS 
WAS PROPER AND THAT FINDING OF 
FACT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS 
PLAINTIFFS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
AGAINST IT 26 
ii 
PAGE 
ADDENDA: 
V. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE 
CITY'S EASEMENT ALONG THIRD NORTH 
STREET SHOULD NOT BE TERMINATED 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO 
PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE THAT WOULD 
WARRANT REFORMATION OF THE 
CONVEYANCE THAT ESTABLISHED THE 
EASEMENT , 
CONCLUSION. 
27 
30 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
TRIAL EXHIBITS 6 & 7-FEDERAL COURT 
STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
TRIAL EXHIBIT 8 DEED CREATING THIRD 
NORTH EASEMENT 
SECTION 25-5-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 AS AMENDED 
B 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d 254 (Utah 1983)... 11 
Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984) 11,28 
Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) 13,14,20,23 
Dansie v. Murray City, 560 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1977).. 24,25 
Hackett v. City of Ottawa, 99 U.S. 86, 25 L.4d 
363 (1878) 21 
Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 
81 L.Ed 2d 42, 104 S. Ct 2218 (1984) 15,24 
Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984) 29,30 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1976) 13,14,21 
Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980) 28 
Town of Boulder v. Bullock, 632 P.2d 716 (Moht. 
1981) 22 
United States v. Lazy F.C. Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 
(197 3) 21 
Utah State University et.al. v. Sutro & Co., 646 
P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) 18-21 
Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 754 
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988) 14,22,23 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-1, 1953 as 
Amended 27 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(i), 1953 
as Amended 1 
IV 
PAGE 
AUTHORITIES 
25 Am Jur 2d § 101 12 
28 Am Jur 2d § 3 5 12,13 
v 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(i) , Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, as this is an appeal 
from portions of a final judgment of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case at bar is a property dispute which 
was tried on the 9th, 10th, 13th and 14th of July, 
1987 before the Seventh Judicial District Court, in 
and for Carbon County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell, presiding. (Amended Findings of Fact 
"FF"; Record on Appeal "RA" 211; Addendum A). Since 
Appellants1 Brief relies upon a Statement of Facts 
that is, in many instances, contrary to the trial 
court's express Findings of Fact, Respondent offers 
the following factual summary: 
(a) Plaintiffs purchased a parcel of real 
property in Price City, Utah in 1977. (FF paragraph 
7; RA 214). 
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(b) At the time of Plaintiffs1 purchase 
of the property, it was subject to a dedicated and 
recorded eighty (80f) foot right-of-way for Cedar 
Hills Drive, a portion of which was paved. (FF 7, 
22; RA 214, 217). 
(c) In late 1977, Plaintiffs commenced 
construction of a home on a portion of the property 
without the benefit of a competent survey. (FF 9; 
RA 214). 
(d) Plaintiff Dale Terry acted as his own 
general contractor, and he had very little experience 
in the home construction field. (FF 8? RA 214). 
(e) Plaintiffs made application to Price 
City for a building permit for the construction of 
a private residence and submitted plans for construction 
of a home. The house plans were the only specifications 
ever presented to the city. In reliance on the plans, 
together with the Plaintiffs' representations of their 
property boundaries, the city issued a building permit 
to allow the proposed construction. (Trans. 444-445; 
Trial Exhibit 31; RA 699-700). 
2 
(f) Plaintiffs talked to a number of city 
employees during the application process but, at no 
time, was any city employee authorized to perform 
personal surveying work for the Plaintiffs nor were 
they authorized or under any obligation to determine 
the Plaintiffs1 property lines. (FF 10-14; RA 214-215). 
(g) Plaintiffs initiated a federal court 
proceeding against Price City over issues concerning 
the construction of Third North Street which was 
resolved by Stipulation and Order of Dismissal in 
late 1981. (Trial Exhibits 6 & 7; Addendum B). 
(h) Pursuant to said Stipulation, each 
of the parties designated an engineering firm to 
determine a proper legal description for the easement 
adjacent to the south boundary of Third North Street. 
Price City then deeded thirty (30f) feet to Plaintiffs, 
reserving unto the city, the fourteen (14f) foot 
easement as described by the mutual agreement of the 
parties1 surveyors and attorneys. (Trial Exhibit 
8; (Addendum C); Trans. 49-55; RA 304-309) 
(i) Subsequent to the settlement of the 
federal court action, Plaintiffs commenced additional 
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construction on their home without obtaining building 
permits or a competent survey. (FF 9; RA 214). 
(j) Without benefit of building permits 
or a survey, Plaintiffs commenced construction on 
Defendant's Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way, Third 
North right-of-way and Defendant's Third North fee 
simple property. (FF 27-32; RA 219-222). 
(k) Such construction by Plaintiffs started 
immediately following the conclusion of the federal 
court action and continued until the time of trial 
in the case at bar, with total disregard to Defendant's 
rights-of-way or even its fee simple property. (FF 
27-32; RA 219-222) . 
(1) In 1983, Plaintiffs applied for a 
variance to construct a six (6') foot fence. The 
Planning and Zoning Commission denied the application. 
The Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the Board 
of Adjustment and received a favorable decision from 
the Board. The City appealed, pursuant to City 
Ordinance, to the City Council which modified the 
Board's decision and granted permission to construct 
a modified fence. The issues in these hearings 
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concerned the height and type of fence to be built, 
not the right to locate the fence on the City's 
rights-of-way. (FF 24; RA 218). 
(m) On or about October 17, 1983, as part 
of the application process for the construction of 
the fence, Plaintiffs presented to the City a map 
representing their property lines, as well as their 
knowledge of the eighty (801) foot Cedar Hills Drive 
right-of-way. (Exhibit 17; FF 17; RA 215-216). 
(n) In reliance on Plaintiffs' map, City 
Engineer Sonntag prepared a drawing (Exhibit 18) and 
placed stakes along the west edge of the right-of-way 
to assist the City council in getting a rough idea 
of Plaintiffs' proposed fence project. (FF 17; RA 
215-216). 
(o) In the late Fall of 1984, the City 
had a survey of Cedar Hills Drive performed and, for 
the first time, learned the exact location of the 
west boundary of said right-of-way. (FF 15; RA 215). 
(p) As soon as the city learned of the 
exact location of the west boundary of the eighty 
(80') foot right-of-way, the city notified the 
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Plaintiffs to refrain from any encroachment upon the 
right-of-way. (FF 16, 19; RA 215, 216). 
(q) Prior to the Cityfs survey, and without 
benefit of their own survey, Plaintiffs had constructed 
a portion of their driveway in the Cedar Hills Drive 
right-of-way. (FF 9, 18; RA 214, 216). 
(r) Following the staking of the Cityfs 
survey upon the ground, Plaintiffs dug trenches for 
their fence. The trenches were also in the City's 
Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way. (FF 27; RA 219). 
(s) The City immediately "red tagged" the 
fence project and no further construction occurred 
on the project. (Trans. 410-411; RA 665-666). 
(t) At trial, Plaintiffs asserted a claim 
of estoppel, but the trial court expressly found that 
Plaintiffs had not reasonably relied on the City's 
actions (FF 12,13,20; RA 215,216) nor had Plaintiffs 
acted with reasonable prudence and diligence (FF 7, 
8,9,14; RA 214,215); and, therefore, held that the 
elements of an estoppel had not been met. 
(u) Additionally, the trial court expressly 
found that Plaintiffs had failed to prove that they 
6 
would suffer any serious injustice if estoppel was 
not applied. (FF 21; RA 217). 
(v) Finally, the trial court expressly 
found that the City had a significant public interest 
in preserving the eighty (80f) foot Cedar Hills Drive 
right-of-way and outlined four specific reasons why 
public policy required the maintenance of the right-of-
way. (FF 22; RA 217). 
(w) The trial court entered judgment as 
follows 
(1) On Plaintiffs1 first cause of 
action based on estoppel, the 
court found in favor of Defendant 
City (Conclusions of Law "CL" 
1; RA 222). 
(2) On Plaintiffs1 second cause of 
action for a declaratory judgment, 
the court found in favor of the 
Plaintiff. (CL 2; RA 223). 
(3) On Plaintiff's third cause of 
action for reformation of a deed, 
the court found in favor of 
Defendant City on its Motion to 
Dismiss at the conclusion of 
Plaintiffs' case-in-chief because 
Plaintiffs failed to present a 
prima facie case. (FF 2; RA 212). 
(4) On Defendant City's Counterclaim, 
the court found a trespass had 
occurred and granted a monetary 
7 
judgment for a portion of the 
damages sought, (CL 5; RA 223). 
(x) Plaintiffs appeal from the Trial Courtfs 
rulings with respect to their first and third causes 
of action as well as from the Court's award of damages 
on the Counterclaim. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that the trial court 
correctly applied the law in finding that the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel cannot properly be asserted 
against the City in this case. Plaintiffs failed 
at trial to product evidence making out the basic 
elements of estoppel, and their claim with respect 
to this issue was correctly dismissed. Even if 
Plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing that the 
elements of estoppel were present; however, it is 
well recognized that, except in unusual or exceptional 
circumstances, estoppel may not be applied against 
a governmental entity. Plaintiffs made no showing 
that theirs is such an extrordinary case. 
Since estoppel cannot be invoked in this 
case, it follows that the trial court's judgment against 
Plaintiffs with respect to the City's Counterclaim 
of trespass was appropriate. There is no reason why 
Defendant should pay the cost of restoring the City's 
property to its original condition. 
Defendant also maintains that this Court 
should affirm the trial court in its refusal to 
9 
terminate the City's easement along 300 North Street. 
The deed is clear and unconditional as to the intent 
of the grantor that the easement should exist. At 
trial. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that the parties 
made a mutual mistake which would warrant reformation 
of the instrument. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
IN EQUITY CASES IS THE "CLEARLY PREPONDERATES STANDARD". 
This Court has established that the 
appropriate standard of appellate review of a trial 
court's findings of fact in equity cases is the "clearly 
preponderates standard". Abbott v. Christensen, 660 
P.2d 254 at 257 (Utah 1983); Bown v. Loveland, 678 
P. 2d 292 (Utah 1984). Under that standard, after 
reviewing the evidence in the case in light of the 
elements set forth, the appellate court should affirm 
the trial court's findings unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the finding. Bown, supra, at 
p.297. 
The case at bar presents issues of estoppel 
and reformation of a deed; both equitable actions, 
and, therefore, the Bown standard is proper. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND SUCH 
A FINDING SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATES AGAINST IT. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs asserted 
a claim of equitable estoppel which would have, for 
all intents and purposes, terminated a portion of 
Defendant City's Cedar Hills Drive easement had the 
trial court granted the relief sought by Plaintiffs. 
Courts do not favor forfeitures of easements. 
25 Am Jur 2d, §101. Said authority goes on to provide 
"an easement cannot be terminated at the will of the 
owner of the servient estate or without consent of 
the party entitled to the easement, unless the 
instrument by which the easement was created clearly 
permits such a termination. There may, however, be 
an estoppel against claiming an easement, as where 
there has been a disclaimer or abandonment, provided 
that all of the elements of an equitable estoppel 
are present." 
The elements of estoppel are outlined in 
28 Am Jur 2d, §35 as follows: 
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As related to the party to be estopped 
the elements are (1) conduct which amounts 
to a false representation or concealment 
of material facts, or, at least, which is 
calculated to convey the impression that 
the facts are otherwise than, and inconsist-
ant with, those which the party subsequently 
attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or 
at least the expectation, that such conduct 
shall be acted upon by, or influence, the 
other party or other persons; and (3) 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the 
real facts. 
As related to the party claiming the 
estoppel, the essential elements are (1) 
lack of knowledge and of the means of 
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in 
question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon 
the conduct or the statements of the party 
to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction 
based thereon of such a character as to 
change the position or status of the party 
claiming the estoppel to his injur^, detriment 
or prejudice. 
Plaintiffs assert abbreviated elements of 
estoppel as outlined in Celebrity Club, Inc. vs. Utah 
Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). 
Said case gives an abbreviated outline of the elements 
of estoppel but refers such abbreviated list to its 
authority in footnote 10, i.e., Morgan vs. Board of 
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, (Utah 1976). See Celebrity 
Club (602 P.2d at page 694, footnote 10). In Morgan, 
supra, the Supreme court held at page 697, "estoppel 
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is a doctrine of equity proposed to rescue from loss 
a party who has, without fault, been deluded into 
a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another." 
This Court then outlined the elements of estoppel 
as follows: 
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant 
Board of State Lands) by his actions, 
representations, or admissions, or by his 
silence when he ought to speak, intentionally 
or through culpable negligence, induces 
another (plaintiffs) to believe certain 
facts to exist and that such others (plain-
tiffs) acting with reasonable prudence and 
diligence, rely and act thereon so that 
he will suffer injustice if the former (Land 
Board) is permitted to deny the existence 
of such facts. 
It is clear from Celebrity Club and Morgan 
as well as the authorities cited therein, that the 
party to be estopped must have intentionally or through 
culpable negligence, induced another to rely and that 
the party seeking estoppel must have exercised 
reasonable prudence and diligence in attempting to 
determine the facts before he relied. 
This Court most recently set forth the 
elements of a claim of estoppel in Williams v. Public 
Service Com'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 53 (Utah 1988): 
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(1) an admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards 
asserted, 
(2) action by the other party oh the faith 
of such admission, statement, or act, 
and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting 
from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement, or act. 
In Heckler v. Community Health Services, 
467 U.S. 51; 81 L. Ed 2d 42; 104 S. Ct. 2218 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court found an implicit 
condition in the elements of estoppel: 
The party claiming the estoppel must have 
relied on its adversary's conduct 'in such 
a manner as to change his position for the 
worse,' and that reliance must have been 
reasonable in that the party claiming the 
estoppel did not know nor should it have 
known that its adversary's conduct was 
misleading."Heckler, supra, at 59.j 
In the present case, the trial court applied 
these principles and entered an express finding of 
the appropriate elements of estoppel in Finding of 
Fact paragraph 5 and the subdivisions thereof: 
5. The Court finds that the 
usual elements of estoppel, as 
applicable to the case at bar, 
consist of the following: 
A. An admission, statement or 
act (this could include silehce 
where there is a duty to speak) 
by the defendant inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted; 
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B. That such action on the part 
of the defendant induced the 
plaintiff to believe the existence 
of certain facts; 
C. That the plaintiff, acting 
with reasonable prudence and dili-
gence, relies and acts thereon; 
and 
D. The plaintiff suffers some 
injury or an injustice will occur, 
if defendant is allowed to deny 
the existence of such facts. 
(FF 5; RA 213). 
The trial court then went on to apply its 
elements to the facts and expressly found that (1) 
the Defendant City did not know the exact location 
of the boundary of the west side of Cedar Hills Drive 
(FF 15; RA 215) and that as soon as the City learned 
the exact location, it notified the Plaintiffs (FF 
16; RA 215); (2) the Plaintiffs had the responsibility 
to establish their boundary lines and the location 
of their home within same (FF 14; RA 215) and they 
failed to secure a survey of their boundaries prior 
to construction (FF 9; RA 214); (3) the Plaintiffs 
purchased their property subject to the dedicated 
and recorded Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way and knew, 
or should have known, of the right-of-way since it 
traversed the entire length of their property (FF 
16 
7; RA 214); (4) the Plaintiffs did not act reasonably 
in their actions (FF 20; RA 216); (5) they failed 
to exercise due diligence and reasonable prudence 
in locating their construction work (CL 1; RA 222); 
and (6) they failed to prove they would suffer serious 
injury or injustice if estoppel was not applied (FF 
21; RA 217). 
Plaintiffs not only failed to provle aji element 
of estoppel; they failed to prove any of the elements 
of estoppel. 
Appellants1 Brief relies on a Statement 
of Facts taken almost entirely from Plaintiff Dale 
Terry's testimony, ignoring the trial court's express 
findings which were contrary to that testimony. 
Applying the appropriate standard of review, Appellants 
have failed to demonstrate that the evidence presented 
at trial "clearly preponderates" against the trial 
court's findings andf therefore, the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
17 
Ill 
IN ARGUENDO, EVEN IF THE ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
HAD BEEN PROVEN, THE FACTS OF THE CASE AT BAR DO NOT 
WARRANT AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT ESTOPPEL CANNOT 
BE ASSERTED AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. 
The doctrine of estoppel, by overwhelming 
majority rule, is not generally applicable to a 
governmental institution. In Utah State University 
vs. Sutro, 646 P.2d 715, (Utah 1982), this Court 
reaffirmed the soundness of the principle that estoppel 
is not generally applicable to governments or 
governmental institutions. The court stated: "we 
have no doubt about the soundness or the salutory 
purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is not 
assertable against the government or governmental 
institutions." Sutro, supra, at 646. The court goes 
on to outline the valuable reasons for that general 
rule. The court also indicated that there is an 
exception to the general rule. 
Not withstanding our approval of that rule, 
like most general rules, there are exceptions 
when its rigid application would defeat, 
rather than serve, the higher purpose that 
all rules are intended to serve: that of 
doing justice. The rule is therefore applied 
when it will serve that purpose. But in 
unusual circumstances, when it is plainly 
18 
apparent that its application would result 
in injustice, and there would be no 
substantial adverse effects on public policy, 
the courts will honor the higher purpose 
of doing justice by envoking the exception, 
rather than departing from that desired 
objective in slavish adherence to a general 
rule. Sutro, supra, at 718. [Emphasis Added]. 
In Sutro, this court found the unusual 
circumstances that it felt justified application of 
the exception. The court found that the University 
and its hired stock brokers had been acting in good 
faith and not under any express statutory prohibition. 
It was not until an attorney general's (opinion was 
issued raising doubt about the legality of the 
University's activities that either party believed 
their conduct to be illegal. In said case, this court 
found that it would be unjust to allow the University 
to escape its contractual obligations with| the brokers 
by utilizing an argument that the contract was void 
by law. Additionally, the court provided at page 
719, that a distinction must be drawn between contracts 
or activities which are either malum in se, or which 
are strictly prohibited by statute and thus may be 
strongly against public policy, as compared to those 
19 
activities such as were outlined in Sutroy which were 
merely not authorized by law but which were not 
prohibited or inherently evil. The court held "in 
the former class of casesf it is quite universally 
held that no estoppel will lie against the government." 
Sutro, supra, at 719. 
Plaintiff cites several cases which utilize 
the doctrine of estoppel; however, each of those cases 
represents a truly unique factual situation. In each 
of the cases, the actions affirmed by adoption of 
the principle of estoppel were not prohibited by 
statute, were not malum in se, and were not strongly 
against public policy. In Celebrity Club, supra, 
the Utah Liquor Control Commission granted a license 
for a liquor store at a proposed location which all 
parties believed to be more than 600 feet from any 
public or private school. Only after the party seeking 
estoppel had expended in excess of $200,000.00 to 
complete the club did the Commission discover that 
an unused portion of public school property existed 
within the 600 foot radius, creating a 48 foot 
discrepancy in the measurements. The court held that 
20 
the doctrine of estoppel as outlined in Morgan, supra, 
was an applicable solution to the case at bar because 
the petitioner/club owner had been faced with a new 
statute containing an apparent ambiguity and he had 
done everything reasonably possible to comply with 
that statute. 
In Sutro, supra, the court recited the history 
of the use of the exception of estoppel for unique 
factual situations involving governments. The court 
cited Hackett vs. City of Ottawa, 99 U.S. 86, 25 L. 
ED. 363 (1878), where city officials issued bonds 
which they believed to be lawful but which turned 
out to be unlawfully issued and upon which numerous 
citizens had relied. The court held that the doctrine 
of estoppel could be utilized in such ^n egregious 
factual situation in order to avoid injustice. 
Additionally, this court cited United States vs. Lazy 
F.C. Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (1973) whereip the court 
found that affirmative misconduct on t}he part of 
government officials, caused the plaintiffs to 
reasonably rely. This court additionally made note 
of the fact that no interest of the public would be 
21 
unduly threatened or damaged by the use of estoppel 
in this fact situation. This Court went on to cite 
several other Utah cases where egregious injury would 
have resulted unless the estoppel doctrine was applied 
against a governmental institution. 
Plaintiffs also cite the Montana case of 
Town of Boulder v. Bullock, 632 P.2d 716 (Mont. 1981), 
in which a city council reneged on its promise to 
a concerned property owner that even if he were building 
into the street, they would "never make a man tear 
down his house." Boulder, at 718. In that case, 
there were affirmative misrepresentations by the city 
of a sort not present in the case at bar. In each 
of these cases, the relying plaintiff had no reasonable 
way to have protected himself against the affirmative 
misconduct or the culpable negligence of the government 
officials, and in each case the public interest was 
not seriously jeopardized nor was the conduct prohibited 
by statute. 
Plaintiffs cannot claim to have suffered 
the kind of egregious injury justifying application 
of the exception. In Williams v. Public Service Comfn, 
22 
754 P.2d 41, 53 (1988), after distinguishing Celebrity 
Club, this Court refused to apply the exception. 
The Court wrote that: 
Williams is not foreclosed fr<bm 
operating his business and obtaining 
a return on his expenditures. 
Although he will no longer £>e 
permitted to operate his business 
in a protected market, he will 
be able to continue all current 
operations. . .Thus, we hold thjat 
any injury to Williams is npt 
of the magnitude which required 
the application of estoppel |in 
Celebrity Club. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated any injury of a magnitude which would 
warrant application of the exception. Their home 
is intact. They have lost nothing except the cost 
of restoring the City's property to i|ts original 
condition—a cost incurred through their own failure 
to determine their boundary lines. As the trial court 
expressly found, the Plaintiffs failed to prove that 
they would suffer any serious injury pr injustice 
if estoppel was not applied (FF 21; RA 217)t 
Finally, even if Plaintiffs had demonstrated 
egregious injury, the estoppel doctrine should not 
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be applied if it violates public policy. In Heckler 
v.Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 81 L Ed 
2d 42, 104 S ct 2218 (1984), the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
[w]hen the Government is unable 
to enforce the law because the 
conduct of its agents has given 
rise to an estoppel, the interest 
of the citizenry as a whole in 
obedience to the rule of law is 
undermined. It is for this reason 
that it is well settled that the 
Government may not be estopped 
on the same terms as any other 
litigant. Heckler, supra, at 
p.60. 
In addition to the cases prevously cited, 
this court has recognized the same public policy 
considerations in Dansie v. Murray City, 560 P.2d 
1123 (Utah 1977). In Dansie, a Murray City employee 
was provided with plans and specifications for the 
erection of a structure by Plaintiff Dansie. The 
City employee approved said plans and issued a building 
permit in compliance therewith. The City employee 
did not ascertain the height of the building, which 
was in excess of the City height requirements as adopted 
by their planning and zoning ordinances. Plaintiff 
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Dansie had almost completed construction of the 
structure when a cease construction order was filed 
I 
against him, alleging that his structure violated 
the height restrictions. Plaintiff Dansie asserted 
estoppel as his defense. This Court held that the 
City was not bound by the representatibns of its 
building inspector and cited numerous authorities 
therefore. 
In the case at bar, the trial court found 
that the public interest in the eighty (80f) foot 
Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way was significant and 
needed to be maintained. (FF 22; RA 217). The court 
listed four specific public interests as a basis for 
that finding. Public policy wars against the notion 
that a significant public right-of-way could be lost 
by acts or omissions of public employeejs. If such 
were the case, every public road in existence would 
be at risk. 
Even if Plaintiffs had proved the elements 
of estoppel and then proved an egregious injury, they 
would not have prevailed because the public interest 
in Cedar Hills Drive must, of necessity, control the 
court's decision. 
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IV 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD TRESPASSED 
ON DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS-OF-WAY AND THAT A MONETARY AWARD 
OF DAMAGES FOR THE CEDAR HILLS DRIVE TRESPASS WAS 
PROPER AND THAT FINDING OF FACT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
UNLESS PLAINTIFFS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATES AGAINST IT. 
All of the evidence at trial supported the 
trial court's findings that three separate parcels 
of the City's property had been, and continued to 
be, trespassed upon by Plaintiffs' construction 
projects: (1) the Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way, 
(2) the Third North right-of-way, and (3) the City's 
fee simple property adjacent to Third North. Plaintiffs 
do not deny the trespass but merely point out that 
the judgment is the natural outgrowth of the trial 
court's refusal to find an estoppel. Defendant agrees. 
It is logical that, absent an estoppel, the Plaintiffs 
should bear the burden of the cost of their trespass. 
It would be very unjust to expect the City or its 
taxpayers to pay for the damage created by Plaintiffs' 
failure to obtain a survey before they commenced 
construction. 
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V 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE CITY'S EASEMENT ALONG 
THIRD NORTH STREET SHOULD NOT BE TERMINATED BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE THAT WOULD 
WARRANT REFORMATION OF THE CONVEYANCE THAT ESTABLISHED 
THE EASEMENT. 
The Statute of Frauds provides that all 
estates or interests in real property shall be in 
writing, subscribed by the party creating or granting 
same. Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1 et seq. (1953 
as amended). (Addendum D). The 14 foot easement adjacent 
to the south boundary of 300 North Street was created 
by a reservation in Price City's deed to the Plaintiffs. 
The reservation speaks for itself and describes the 
intent and the purpose of the City grantor, not the 
frame of mind or understanding of the grantee. 
Plaintiffs claim that it was the understanding 
of both parties that the easement was necessary only 
for the purpose of allowing the City to maintain the 
slope running from 300 North Street to Plaintiffs' 
property. They claim that it was only through mutual 
mistake that the deed does not reflect this intention, 
and that the instrument should be reformed now that 
Appellants have filled in the slope. (Appellant Brief 
at p. 17-18. ) 
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Plaintiffs, however, failed to demonstrate 
at trial that any mutual mistake occurred. They argue, 
instead, that it was incumbent upon the City to provide 
"expert testimony" showing that the City had a 
legitimate need for the easement after the slope was 
filled in. (Appellant Brief at p. 17-18.) The City 
contends that this is a serious misrepresentation 
of the burdens of the respective parties: it was 
Plaintiffs' responsibility to demonstrate the propriety 
of reformation. They failed even to plead mutual 
mistake in their amended complaint—an oversight that 
is fatal to their claim. Bown v. Loveland, 678 P. 2d 
292, 295 (Utah 1984)—cited by Plaintiffs in support 
of their case—states: 
To reform a warranty deed or any 
written instrument, the Plaintiff 
must show mutual mistake of the 
parties...Proof of the mistake 
must be by clear and convincing 
evidence. A party seeking 
reformation of a deed due to mutual 
mistake must plead such mistake 
with particularity. 
Other cases cited by Plaintiffs are similarly 
not on point. Thompson v. Smith, 620 P. 2d 520 (Utah 
1980) involved fraud on the part of one of the parties; 
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and Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984) 
involved oversight by the scrivener.1 Neither 
circumstance is present here, and any mistake was 
solely on Plaintiffs1 part. Unilateral mistake alone 
is not sufficient to warrant reformation, and the 
trial court found, at the conclusion of Plaintiffs1 
case-in-chief, that no evidence had been presented 
which would support a cause of action for reformation 
and, therefore, granted Defendant's Motion] to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action. 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to find that the Plaintiffs1 case 
prevails over the trial court's judgment, this Court 
must findr after review, that the evidence in favor 
of the Plaintiffs clearly preponderates over the lower 
court's findings. Plaintiffs' Brief simply fails 
to provide any justification for a reversal of the 
lower court's ruling. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs argue general 
principles but do not apply them to the facts of their 
own case. With respect to the doctrine of estoppel, 
Plaintiffs do not identify any false representations 
of the City on which they were entitled to rely, in 
light of the fact that they bought their property 
subject to the City's recorded 80 foot right-of-way. 
Hottinger, a case cited by Plaintiffs, is illuminating 
in this regard: "It is a well-established principle 
of law that where circumstances are such that a 
reasonably prudent person should make inquiries, the 
law charges the person with notice of facts which 
a reasonably diligent inquiry would have disclosed." 
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Hottinger, supra at 1274. Representations of the 
City's employees, especially those based on information 
Plaintiffs themselves provided to the City, do not 
absolve Plaintiffs of the responsibility for their 
own mistakes. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that the 
rule that estoppel should not apply to governmental 
entities does not apply in their case, but they do 
not demonstrate why this is so. They fail to articulate 
any reasons why the standards set forth by this Court 
for identifying cases in which the exception should 
apply are met in this case. The evidence established 
at trial was resoundingly clear: (1) application 
of the general rule does not work a serious injustice 
since Plaintiffs suffered no egregious injury, and, 
(2) failure to apply the rule would adversely affect 
the public interest. 
Judgment against Plaintiffs for trespass 
was appropriate, given, as Plaintiffs admit, that 
such judgment is a logically appropriate consequence 
of the Court's refusal to allow Plaintiffs to invoke 
the doctrine of estoppel. As to Plaintiffs' claim 
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that the City's easement should terminate, there was 
simply no evidence presented at trial that would provide 
a basis for such a termination. 
Plaintiffs' mistakes are unfortunate, but 
there is no reason why they should be allowed to profit 
by their mistakes to the extent of causing a 
court-mandated forfeiture of the City's rights to 
its own public property. Respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of March, 
1989. 
jp&NE PAPPAS WHITE 
t^Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the following: 
Duane R. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Prowswood Plaza, Suite 306 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class 
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail 
at Price, Utah this 3rd day of March, 1989. 
ANE PAPPAS WHIT fy 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
ADDENDUM "A" 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Defendant 
Oliveto Building, Suite 4 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR, CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALE L- TERRY and BARBARA H. 
TERRY, individuals. 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs, 
PRICE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.14680 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court on the 9th, 10th, 13th and 14th of July, 1987. 
The Plaintiffs were personally present in Court and represented 
by their attorney, Duane R. Smith; the Defendant was represented 
personally by its agents and attorney, Joane Pappas White and 
Luke G. Pappas; and the Court heard testimony and received 
exhibits and orally made findings and ruled on Plaintiffs' Third 
Cause of Action and took the balance of the issues under 
advisement; and the Court having been fully advised in the 
premises now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That jurisdiction and venue are proper before 
this Court. 
2. That Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action requested 
a termination of Price City's 14 foot easement for a portion 
of Third North Street . located in Price, Utah. That Defendant 
raised a Motion to Dismiss at the conclusions of Plaintiff's 
case in chief with respect to said Third Cause of Action. The 
Court finds from the evidence that the Defendant deeded to the 
Plaintiff a strip of property adjacent to Third North Street, 
reserving unto itself a 14 foot easement for purposes of 
maintaining a public street. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' 
Third Cause of Action fails to state a cause of action upon 
which relief can be granted and further finds that Plaintiffs 
have failed to sustain their burden of proof with respect to 
said Third Cause of Action. 
3. With respect to the First Cause of Action, the 
Plaintiffs are asking the Court to estop the City from denying 
that the west edge of Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way is 31 feet 
from the east side of Plaintiffs' home and the Plaintiffs are 
further asking the Court to declare that the west edge of Cedar 
Hills Drive right-of-way is as set forth in a drawing sent to 
Plaintiffs by an employee of Defendant City on October 26, 1983, 
which is Exhibit 2 of the Complaint and evidentiary Exhibit 
18. 
4. With respect to the First Cause of Action, the 
Court finds that the basic statement of law is that the rule 
of estoppel is not generally assertible against governmental 
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institutions for many good and sufficient reasons that the Court 
will not, at this time, review. The Court finds that the Supreme 
Court has approved exceptions to this general rule when the 
ususal elements of estoppel are present, and there are unusual 
circumstances, where the use of estoppel would prevent a serious 
injustice without unduly damaging or adversely affecting the 
public interest. 
5. The Court finds that usual elements of estoppel, 
as applicable to the case at bar, to consist of the following: 
A. An admission, statement or act (this could include 
silence where there is a duty to speak) by the defendant 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards assertedj; 
B. That such action on the part of the defendant 
induced the plaintiff to believe the existence of certain facts; 
C. That the plaintiff, acting with reasonable prudence 
and diligence, relies and acts thareon; and 
D. The plaintiff suffers some injury or an injustice 
will occur, if defendant is allowed to deny the existence of 
such facts, 
6. The Court finds " that the Plaintiffs have the 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, "first 
that the usual elements of estoppel are present and, second, 
that the elements necessary to overcome the general rule 
applicable to governmental entities are also present. 
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7. Based upon the testimony and exhibits received, 
the Court finds that the Plaintiffs purchased the land adjacent 
to Cedar Hills Drive in 1977f and, at the time of their purchase, 
they knew, or should have known, that the Defendant City had 
a dedicated 80 foot right-of-way for Cedar Hills Drive that 
traversed the entire length of their property. 
8. That the Plaintiffs commenced to construct a 
home on a portion of the property next to the Cedar Hills Drive 
right-of-way in late 1977 and that the Plaintiff Dale Terry 
acted as his own general contractor and that he had very little 
experience in the home construction field. 
9. That at no time prior to the commencement of 
the construction, or thereafter, until the Fall of 1984, did 
the Plaintiffs secure or request that a survey be made of their 
property to determine the exact boundary of the 8 0 foot Cedar 
Hills Drive right-of-way. 
10. That the Plaintiffs, prior to the start of 
construction, requested John Huefner, the then-acting City 
Engineer, to establish the setback distance from their home 
along Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way and along Third North Street. 
11. That pursuant to said request, the City Engineer, 
John Huefner, placed two sakes along Cedar Hills Drive 
right-of-way 35 feet from the west edge of the right-of-way 
to show the setback, and that he used the 80 foot right-of-way 
dimensions in placing the stakes. 
12. That the City Engineer, John Huefner, did not 
lave the responsibility as part of the duties of his office 
:o place home locations for property owners on their property, 
md any such activity was beyond the scope of his employment. 
13. That the Plaintiffs have not established by a 
Dreponderance of the evidence that the City Engineer actually 
staked the location for the placement of the home itself on 
the Plaintiffs' property. 
14. The Court finds that it was the responsibility 
of the Plaintiffs to place the location of the home in relation 
to the Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way. 
15. The Court finds that the Defendant City did not 
know the exact boundary of the west side of Cedar Hills Drive 
at the location of Plaintiffs' property until the City had a 
survey completed in the late Fall of 1984. 
16. The Court finds that as soon as the Defendant 
City learned of the exact location of the west boundary of the 
80 foot right-of-way, the City notified the Plaintiffs to refrain 
from any encroachment upon said right-of-way. 
17. The Court finds that when the City Engineer Sonntag 
went to the property in October of 1983 and placed stakes along 
the west edge of the right-of-way, he did so at the request 
of the City Council of the Defendant and, in order to get said 
City a rough idea of the appearance and placement on the ground 
of Plaintiffs' proposed fence. The Court finds that such stakes 
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were not intended to show the exact boundary of the right-of-way. 
The drawing prepared by the City Engineer, Exhibit 18, and sent 
to the Plaintiffs, shows and 80 foot right-of-way and further 
shows a fence proposed by the Plaintiffs was to be placed on 
the west edge of that right-of-way. The reference to the distance 
from the fence to Plaintifffs1 home (31) feet was taken from 
Plaintiffs' drawing. Exhibit 17, which drawing was submitted 
by the Plaintiffs with their fence application, and the Court 
finds that it was not intended to be, or could it have reasonably 
been interpreted, as the exact location of the west boundary 
of the right-of-way from Plaintiffs1 home. 
18. The Court finds that although City employees 
may have observed the Plaintiffs in their construction of the 
driveway from Plaintiffs' garage onto a portion of the Cedar 
Hills Drive right-of-way in 1983, they were under no duty to 
object, since those City employees were unaware of the exact 
location of the west boundary line of the right-of-way until 
the survey was completed in the late Fall of 1984. 
19. That upon the completion of the survey, the 
Defendant forthwith informed the Plaintiffs that they had 
trespassed on Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way and advised them 
to stop further work thereon. 
20. The Court finds that the Plaitniffs did not act 
reasonably if they relied upon any representations of City 
employees as to the exact location of the 80 foot right-of-way. 
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21. The Court further finds that no evidence was 
presented to show that the Plaintiffs would suffer serious 
injustice if the estoppel against the Defendant was not applied. 
The only result of failure to apply the estoppel doctrine as 
prayed for would be that the west right-of-way line would be 
10 feet from the side of Plaintiffs home at the closest point. 
The Court cannot find from this fact alone that Plaintiffs will 
suffer serious injury. 
22. The Court finds that the public interest in the 
80 foot right-of-way is significant and needs to be maintained 
for the following facts presented at trial. 
A. The right-of-way is a major traffic artery and 
is presently being used as such. 
B. That the right-of-way contains utilities consisting 
of underground telephone lines, two sewer lines, overhead power 
lines, as well as the hard surface for the flow of traffic. 
C. Improvements on the right-of-way immediately 
north of the subject property have been installed on the west 
side of the right-of-way based upon an 80 foot right-of-way. 
D. That future plans call for the installation of 
curb, gutter and sidewalk on the right-of-way line, together 
with a turn lane and possible access lanes. I 
23. With respect to the Plaintiffs' Second Cause 
of Action, Plaintiffs ask for a declarator^ judgment declaring 
that the ordinances of Price City relative to appeals from the 
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Board of Adjustment to the City Council are void and ineffective 
as they apply to Price City as an aggrieved party. 
24. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs made 
application for a variance with respect to the height of their 
fence. That Plaintiffs requested that the Price City Board 
of Adjustments grant Plaintiffs permission to build a six-foot 
fence, rather than the four-foot fence permitted by the statute. 
25. The Court finds that the Board of Adjustment 
granted the variance on September 26, 1983 and that on September 
28, 1983, the Price City Zoning Administrator, acting on behalf 
of the City of Price, appealed that decision to the City Council 
in accordance with Section 2-22 of the Price City Land Development 
Code. Said Code section provides, "Any party aggrieved by a 
decision of the Board of Adjustments may appeal such decision 
to the governing body of the local jurisdiction." The Court 
further finds that Section 2-23 of the Land Code further provides, 
in substance, that the decision of the governing body (city 
council) shall be final as to the administrative action taken 
by the local jurisdiction, and such decisions may affirm or 
reverse the decision of the Board of Adjustments, in whole or 
in part. 
The Court finds that when Price City adopted Section 
2-22 of the Land Code, the obvious intent was to allow aggrieved 
parties, other than the City, the right of appeal to the City 
Council. To impose a construction allowing an appeal by the 
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ity to itself would give the City an absolute veto power over 
he Board of Adjustments on any matter where they chose to 
ntervene. The City could make themselves an aggrieved party 
n any action before the Board of Adjustments by having one 
if their employees file a notice of appeal on their behalf and 
:hus completely nulify the very reason for the existence of 
:he Board of Adjustments and they would, in effect, take over 
ill of the duties and responsibilities of tha^ : Board at their 
:hoosing. 
26. With respect to Defendant's Counterclaim, the 
Defendant has asked the Court to award damages against the 
Plaintiffs for trespass upon Defendant's deeded property and 
upon Defendants' reserved right-of-ways. The Defendant contends 
that they are entitled to the cost of removing items placed 
upon their property and upon the right-of-ways by the Plaintiffs. 
27. With respect to the allegations of trespass on 
Cedar Hills Drive, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have 
trespassed upon Defendant's dedicated easement and have placed 
a portion of a cement driveway and an asphalt apron on the right-
of-way. The Court further finds that the Plaintiffs have dug 
a trench approximately two feet wide and two feet deep in said 
right-of-way. The Court further finds that such trespass was 
not willful or intentional, but was done under a mistaken belief 
as to where the west boundary of the right-of-way existed. 
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28. Based upon the findings herein set forth with 
respect to the First Cause of Action, the Court finds that the 
Defendant is not estopped from claiming damages, by way of 
Defendant's Counterclaim, for the trespass. The Court finds 
that the Defendant made no representations as to the exact 
location of the boundary to the Plaintiffs for the purpose of 
establishing a boundary, and the Plaintiffs did not use reasonable 
prudence and diligence when they relied upon any actions of 
Defendant's employees relative to the location of the right-of-way 
boundary. 
29. The Court further finds that the amounts bid 
by Tony Siaparis Construction Company, Exhibit 51, for the removal 
of that portion of the cement drive and asphalt apron located 
within the right-of-way, in the sum of $7,074.00, is a reasonable 
sum to be paid for the removal of Plaintiffs' encroachment for 
the driveway and the apron. The Court further finds that the 
sum of $754.00 is a reasonable sum to be expended to fill and 
restore the road bed where the trenches have been dug. The 
Court finds that the encroachment of the driveway and apron, 
as well as the trench, would interfere with the City's right 
to maintain its right-of-way as dedicated. 
30. With respect to the allegations of damage to 
Defendant for items placed on Defendant's deeded property along 
Third North Street, the Court finds that part of the consideration 
for the conveyance of that property by the Plaintiffs to the 
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lefendant was the right of the Plaintiffs to install a 30 foot 
,ccess opening on the south side of Third North Street and to 
ronstruct a ramp from the opening to Plaintiffs * patient parking 
>ver Defendant's land at a point to be selected by the Plaintiffs. 
I?he Court finds that the Plaintiffs selected an opening and 
:onstruction a ramp in accordance with their right to do so, 
Dut that Plaintiffs exceeded the reservation in that the ramp 
Is 32 feet wide, rather than 30 feet wide, and that the opening 
Dnto 300 North Street is 50 feet wide rather than 30 feet wide. 
31. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs have 
constructed a cement retaining wall on Defendant's property 
and along a portion of the reserved right-of-way along 300 North 
Street. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have installed 
a cement pad and stairs on Defendant's property and that such 
action constitutes an unintentional trespass. 
32. The Court further finds that the property adjacent 
to Third North Street was obtained by the Defendant from the 
Plaintiffs and that the right-of-way was reserved to the Defendant 
to maintain, replace and repair the present street, and that 
because of the configuration of Mead's Wash, where it proceeds 
under Third North Street, that the property conveyed to the 
Defendant by the Plaintiffs can only be used for the purpose 
of maintaining the roadbed of Third North Street. The Court 
finds that there is no evidence that the improvements, retaining 
wall, excess driveway, and a few feet of sidewalk along Third 
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North Street will in any way prevent or hinder the Defendant 
in maintaining and repairing Third North Street. 
33. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs did not 
intentionally damage the Defendant's property and did not act 
maliciously and will not award any punitive damages. 
Additionally, the Court finds that the financial status of the 
Plaintiffs was not put into evidence, which would be required 
to fix any punitive damage. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of 
Fact, now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That with respect to Plaintiffs' First Cause 
of Action, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the 
doctrine of estoppel is not applicable to the Defendant because 
of the lack of a showing of representation by the Defendant 
to the Plaintiffs of the exact location of the west boundary 
of Cedar Hills Drive. The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs 
did not act with reasonable prudence and diligence in determining 
the exact location of the boundary and that there were no 
extraordinary or unusual circumstances in this case and that 
there was no showing of serious injury or damage and that the 
imposition of the doctrine of estoppel against the Defendant 
governmental entity would adversely affect the public's interest 
in^maintaining the 80 foot right-of-way as dedicated. The Court, 
therefore, finds in favor of the Defendant and against the 
Plaintiffs' on Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. 
2. With respect to Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, 
he Court finds in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the 
)efendant and concludes
 m and declares that any ordinance that 
tllows Price City to appeal a decision of the Board of Adjustments 
:o themselves is null and void, and the order of the City setting 
iside the Plaintiffs' previous variance, allowed by the Board 
of Adjustments, is ordered set aside, ' 
3. With respect to Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action, 
the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs 
have failed to maintain their burden of proof with respect to 
the allegations in the First Cuase of Action and the Court 
dismissess same on Defendants's Motion to Dismiss upon 
presentation of the Plaintiffs' case in chief. 
4. With respect to Defendant's Counterclaim, the 
Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have trespassed upon 
Defendant's deeded ,property adjacent to Third North Street and 
that the Plaintiffs have trespassed on Defendant's reserved 
rights-of-way for Third North Street and Cedar Hills Drive. 
5. The Court concludes that the Defendant is entitled 
to judgment against the Plaintiffs in the sum of $7,828.00 for 
and as damages sustained by the Defendant because of Plaintiffs' 
trespass on Defendant's Cedar Hills Drive right-of-way. 
6. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have trespassed 
upon Defendant's deeded property and reserved right-of-way 
adjacent to Third North Street but that Defendant is not entitled 
to a monetary judgment for said trespass. 
7. That based on said facts, the Court concludes, 
as a matter of law, that the doctirne of estoppel is not 
applicable to the Defendant for the lack of a showing of 
representation by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs of the exact 
location of the west boundary of Cedar Hiills Drive. The Court 
further finds and concludes that the Plaintiffs did not act 
with reasoanble prudence and diligence in determining the exact 
location of the boundary, and that there was no extraordinary 
or unusual circumstances in this case and no showing of serious 
injury or damage ot the Plaintiffs, and that the imposition 
of the doctrine of estoppel against the Defendant governmental 
entity would adversely affect the public interests in maintaining 
the 80 foot right-of-way as dedicated. 
8. The Court finds that the City's exclusive remedy, 
if they disagree with the Board of Adjustments, is the right, 
provided by State law under Sectin 10-9-15, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, which specifically sets forth the right of 
the city to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction 
if the city disagrees with the borard of adjustment. 
9. Based upon the facts, the Court finds in favor 
of Plaintiffs on their Second Cause of Action and declares that 
any ordinance that allows Price City to appeal a decision of 
the Board of Adjustments to themselves is null and void, and 
the order of the City setting aside the Plaintiffs' previous 
variance allowed by the Board of Adjustments is ordered set 
aside. 
10. The Court has concluded that the Defendant is 
not entitled to a monetary judgment for any damage along Third 
North Street. 
11. The Court finds that judgment should be entered 
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs in the 
sum of $7,828.00. 
12. The Court finds that each of the parties shall 
bear their own Court costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
13. No punitive damages are awarded herein. 
/ 
DATED this & day of October, 1987 
JIOTTORABtEBpYD " BUNNELL 
/District £ourt Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this day of 
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, postage 
prepaid to Plaintiffs' attorney Duane R. Smith, addressed as 
follows: Duane R. Smith, Poole, Cannon & Smith, Prowswood Plaza, 
Suite 306, 4885 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
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Gena Welch 
S e c r e t a r y t o Mrs. White 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE 
\ttorney for Defendant 
Dliveto Building, Suite 4 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR, CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALE L. TERRY and BARBARA H. 
TERRYf individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs, 
PRICE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.14680 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court on the 9th, 10th, 13th and 14th of July, 1987. 
The Plaintiffs were personally present in Court and represented 
by their attorney, Duane R. Smith; the Defendant was represented 
personally by its agents and attorney, Joane Pappas White and 
Luke G. Pappas; and the Court heard testimony and received 
exhibits and orally made findings and ruled on Plaintiffs1 Third 
Cause of Action and took the balance of the issues under 
advisement; and the Court having been fully advised in the 
premises; and the Court having entered the foregoing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, thereforeL 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their 
burden of proof with respect to their First Cause of Action. 
2. With respect to Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, 
the Court declares that any ordinance that allows Price City 
to appeal a decision of the Board of Adjustments to themselves 
is null and void. The Court further orders that the order of 
the City setting aside the Plaintiffs' previous variance, allowed 
by the Board of Adjustments, is hereby ordered set aside. 
3. With respect to Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action, 
the COurt finds that Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their 
burden of proof and, therefore, grants Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss with respect to said Third Cause of Action. 
4. With respect to Defendant's Counterclaim, the 
Defendant is granted judgment against the Plaintiffs in the 
sum of $7,828.00 for and as damage done by Plaintiffs' trespass 
onto Defendant's reserved right-of-way for Cedar Hills Drive. 
5. No punitive damages are awarded herein. 
6. Each party is ordered to bear their own costs 
and attorneys' fees in this matter. 
DATED this J ? / day of October, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
/~> , A I do hereby certify that on this //if day of 
b (f ftrCig j , 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Judgment, postage prepaid to Plaintiffs' 
attorney Duane R. Smith, addressed as follows: Prowswood Plaza, 
Suite 306, 4885 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
Gena'Welch 
Secretary to Mrs. White 
ADDENDUM "B" 
TRIAL EXHIBITS 6 & 7-FEDERAL COURT 
STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
ADDENDUM "Bl 
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT 
Civil No. C 78 0342 
James S. Lowrie, and 
Suzanne M. Dallimore, of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant Price City 
800 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
oooOooo 
DALE L. TERRY and BARBARA 
TERRY, his wife, individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRICE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
a/k/a THE CITY OF PRICE, et 
al., 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
The Plaintiffs, Dale L. Terry and Barbara Terry, by 
and through their counsel of record, Robert S. Camobell, Jr. 
of and for Watkiss & Campbell, the Defendant Price Municipal 
Corporation, aA/a The City of Price (hereinafter "Price City") 
by and through its counsel of record, James S. Lowrie of and 
for Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, and the defendants 
Carbon County Housing Authority (hereinafter "Housing Authority") 
and H-E Lowdermilk Company, by and through their counsel of 
record, Duane Frandsen, stipulate and agree that the above-
entitled action shall be settled upon the following terms and 
conditions: 
1. The }ury trial set in this matter for June 8, 1981 
shall be stricken from the trial calendar. 
2. The Housing Authority shall pay a sum to tne 
plaintiffs on or before June 15, 19 81, based upon the following 
calculations: 
(i) An analysis shall be made by civil engineers 
selected by the plaintiffs and defendants to determine 
the width and length of 300 North Street as it relates 
to and includes the plaintiffs* real property designa-
ted as Parcel 2 in this litigation. Based upon such 
analysis a description of that portion of plaintiffs' 
Parcel 2 included in 300 North Street shall be prepared 
and the acreage within such area quantified. Said 
description shall also include a strip of land 3 feet 
in width from the toe of the south fill on 30 0 North 
Street. 
(ii) The plaintiffs shall thereupon convey the 
fee simple interest in said described property to 
Price City in return for the simultaneous payment by 
the defendants of a sum calculated by multiplying 
the quantified acreage of the parcel conveyed by 
$15,000 an acre. 
3. In addition, the defendants, severally and jointly, 
shall pay to the plaintiffs the sum of $58,0 80.00 as residuary 
damages on or before June 15, 19 81. 
4. Price City shall grant to the plaintiffs the follow-
ing variances, access openings of vehicle ingress and egress, 
and building permits in the following particulars: 
(i) Price City shall grant the plaintiffs with-
out cost a 30 foot'access opening from the south side 
of 300 North Street to the plaintiffs* Parcel 1 at a 
point designated by plaintiffs1 engineer for the con-
struction of a ramp providing 'access to and from 300 
North to the plaintiffs1 proposed patient parking. 
(ii) Price City shall issue and furnish to the 
plaintiffs without cost the necessary building permit 
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for the construction of the improvement described in 
Paragraph 4(i) of this Stipulation. 
( m ) Price City shall issue and furnish to the 
plaintiffs without cost a building permit to remove, 
modify and complete the construction of the plaintiffs' 
driveway, wing walls, and close the north side of their 
structure on Parcel 1 facing 300 North Street. 
(IV) Price City shall grant the plaintiffs 
without cost a 30 foot access opening from the west 
side of Cedar Hills Drive at a point described by 
plaintiffs' engineer for the placement of a driveway 
to a detached garage to be constructed on Parcel 1 
and, if necessary, Parcel 2. In this connection, 
Price City will permit the plaintiffs to extend the 
southern boundary line of Parcel 1 to add a portion 
of Parcel 2, if necessary, for the garage construction. 
(v) Price City shall issue and furnish to the 
plaintiffs without cost the necessary building permit 
for the construction of the detached garage and drive-
way described in Paragraph 4{iv) of this Stipulation. 
(vi) Price City shall issue and furnish to the 
plaintiffs without cost any necessary building permits 
to complete construction of the plaintiffs' home, dental 
office, patient parking, and all improvements associated 
therewith on Parcel 1. Upon completion of the con-
struction of the home, office, garage and attendant 
improvements on Parcel 1, Price City shall conduct 
a final inspection and issue a Certificate of Occupancy, 
or its legal equivalent, demonstrating the subject home 
and office is acceptable for use and occupation. 
(vn) Price Cit} shall grant to the Plaintiffs, 
their heirs, successors and assigns, without cost, an 
access opening 50 feet in width fron the south side 
of 300 North Street to the remaining Parcel 2 west 
of Meads Wash. 
( v m ) Plaintiffs acknowledge that Price City is 
required to make inspections in connection with con-
struction as herein contemplated. Plaintiffs further 
acknowledge that plaintiffs will have to make applica-
tion for such permits as are contemplated hereunder. 
Plaintiffs further acknowledge that waiver of fees 
requires resort to municipal resolution. 
5. This Stipulation contemplates and is conditioned 
upon the fact that Price City has no present plans to change 
the grade, width or location of 300 North Street, or to con-
struct curb and gutter on 300 North Street along the south right-
of-way line of 300 North Street as it abutts Parcels 1 and 2 of 
Plaintiffs* property. 
6. Price City shall convey back to the plaintiffs that 
portion of the 30 foot by 170 foot right-of-way dedicated by the 
plaintiffs to Price City on Parcel 1 which lies south of a line 
3 feet south of the toe of the slone of the shoulder of 300 
North Street as presently constructed. 
7. The plaintiffs shall agree to disnissal with pre-
judice of the defendant, Carbon County Housing Authority and any 
individual defendants with -prejudice in the action of Dale L. 
Terry and Barbara Terry, et ux. vs. Carbon County Housing Authority, 
et al., in the District Court in and for Carbon County, State 
of Utah, Civil No. 12332. It is expressly understood and agreed 
by the parties hereto that the plaintiffs reserve all claims 
they have or may assert against H-E Lowdermilk Construction Company 
in the legal action described m this paragraph. The dismissal 
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of the Carbon County Housing Authority fron the legal action 
described in this Paragraph shall not be deemed by any party to 
be a waiver of or estoppel as to any claims of the plaintiffs 
against any remaining party. 
8. This Stipulation shall be, upon execution by the 
parties, lodged with the C m e f Judge of the United States 
District Court for Utah pending the implementation of the terms 
and provisions hereof. Upon payment of all sums to the plaintiffs 
by the defendants of the monies described in Paragraphs 2 and 3 
herein, not later than the close of the business day on Monday, 
June 15, 1981, the parties shall submit to the Chief Judge a 
stipulation and order for dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs' 
Complaint and the defendants' Counterclaim, pursuant to Rule 41, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(a) In the event that the monies to be paid by 
the defendants to the plaintiffs under Paragraphs 2 and 
3 herein are not in fact paid by the close of the 
business day on Monday, June 15, 19 81, this Stipulation 
for Settlement may be filed with the Clerk of the Court 
and a judgment incorporating the provisions of the 
Stipulation shall be submitted to the Chief Judge to 
be entered and filed in the action. In the latter 
event, said judgment shall bear interest on the sums 
unpaid at the rate of 12% per annum; 
(b) Each of
 #the parties shall bear their own 
costs and fees and expenses in this litigation. 
9. Plaintiffs by this stipulation waive all claims 
and release the defendants and each of them from all causes of 
action which have been pleaded or which could have been pleaded 
arising out of the facts and circumstances of this case. 
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10. The defendants by this Stipulation waive all 
claims and release the plaintiffs, and each of them, from all 
causes of action which have been pleaded or which could have 
been pleaded in their Counterclaim arising out of the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
11. Plaintiffs agree to keep the amounts payable 
hereunder strictly confidential. 
DATED this /£ day of June, 19 31. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
yVaihes S. Ldtfr ie^ 
Attorneys for Defendant Price City 
FRANDSEN, KELLER & JENSEN 
DUane A. Frandsen 
Attorneys for Carbon County Housing 
Authority and H-E Lowdermilk Company 
Exhibit D 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
E. BARNEY GESAS • 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
J * ? 
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DALE L. TERRY and BARBARA 
TERRY, his wife, individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
PRICE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
a/k/a THE CITY OF PRICE, et al, 
Defendants, 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C-78-0342 
STIPULATION 
The Plaintiffs, DALE L. TERRY and BARBARA TERRY, by and 
through their counsel of record, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and E. 
Barney Gesas of and for Watkiss & Campbell, the Defendant, PRICE 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, a/k/a The City of Price (hereinafter "Price 
City"), by and through its counsel of record, James S. Lowrie and 
Suzanne M. Dallimore, of and for Jones, Waldo * Holbrook & McDonoug] 
and the Defendants, CARBON COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY (hereinafter 
"Housing Authority") and H-E LOWDERMILK COMPANY, by and through 
their counsel of record, Duane Frandsen, stipulate and agree: 
1. The Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a settle 
ment agreement (hereinafter the "settlement agreement") resolving 
all claims in this matter on June 10, 1981. I 
2. The settlement agreement provided for the payment 
to the Plaintiffs by the Defendants of an undisclosed amount 
which Plaintiffs acknowledge they have received. 
(v) Price City shall issue and furnish to the 
Plaintiffs without cost the necessary building permit 
for the construction of the detached garage and drive-
way described in Paragraph 4 (iv) of this Stipulation. 
"~ (vi) Price City shall issue and furnish to the 
Plaintiffs without cost any necessary building permits 
to complete construction of the Plaintiffs' home, denta 
office/ patient parking, and all improvements associate< 
therewith on Parcel 1. Upon completion of the construc-
tion of the home, office, garage and attendant improve-
ments on Parcel 1, Price City shall conduct a final 
inspection and issue a Certificate of Occupancy, or its 
legal equivalent, demonstrating the subject home and 
office is acceptable for use and occupation. 
(vii) Price City shall grant to the Plaintiffs, 
their heirs, successors and assigns, without cost, an 
access openina 50 feet in width from the south side of 
300 North Street to the remaining Parcel 2 west of 
Meads Wash. j 
(viii) Plaintiffs acknowledge that Price City is 
required to make inspections in connection with con-
struction as herein contemplated. Plaintiffs further 
acknowledge that Plaintiffs will have to make applica-
tion for such permits a3 are contemplated hereunder. 
Plaintiffs further acknowledge that waiver of fees 
requires resort to municipal resolution. 
5. Price City shall convey back to the Plaintiffs 
that portion of the 30 foot by 170 foot right-of-way dedicated by 
the Plaintiffs to Price City on Parcel 1 which lies south of a 
line 3 feet south of the toe of the slope of the shoulder of 300 
North Street as presently constructed. 
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JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
y J^VES S.)LOWRIE 
SUZANNE^M. DALLIHORE 
•*• Attorneys for Defendant Price City 
F
*ANDSEN, SELLER & JENSEN 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN A _ _ v ^ / ^ 
Attorneys for CarboiyCounty Housing 
Authority and H-E Lowdermilk Compan 
ORDER pF DISMISSAL 
Based upon the foreg0ing stipulation and the Court 
finding that good cause exists therein, ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Court approves the terms and conditions of the 
foregoing Stipulation for Ord<*r 0f Dismissal. 
2. The Plaintiffs
 shal! convey to the Housing Author-
ity in fee simple interest a portion of their real property 
designated as Parcel 2 in this litigation. The Court recognizes 
that the Plaintiffs and the H 0 u si n g Authority have mutually 
agreed upon the legal description of the real property to be con-
veyed in accordance with this paragraph. 
3. Price City shan
 grant to the Plaintiffs the 
variances, access openings of vehicle ingress and egress and 
building permits, as more particularly set forth in Paragraph 4 
of the Stipulation entered herein. 
4. Price City shau convey back to the Plaintiffs 
that portion of the 30 foot by i70 f00t right-of-way dedicated bi 
the Plaintiffs to Price City ^ n Parcel 1 which lies south of a 
line 3 feet south of the toe ^f
 t n e slope of the shoulder of 200 
North Street as presently constructed. 
5. The Plaintiffs shall file a pleading dismissing 
with prejudice the Defendant, Carbon County Housing Authority, 
and any individual^Defendants with prejudice in the action of 
Dale L. Terry and Barbara Terry , et ux. vs. Carbon County Housing 
Authority, ot al.# in the District Court in and for Carbon County 
State of Utah, Civil No. 12332. 
6. Each of the parties in this action shall bear thei 
own costs, expenses and attorneys fees incurred in this action, 
7. The Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to keep the 
amounts payable under the June 10, 1981 settlement agreement 
confidential, 
8. The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and the Defen-
dants' Counterclaim are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 7 diy of November, 1981. 
BY THE COURT: 
United States'/District Judge ^t> 
Copies mailed c^i 11/9/81 :dp 
Robert S. Caiii{jbell, Jr., Esq. 
Herschel J. Sapexstein Esq. 
Duane R. Smilh, Esq. 
E. Barney Gesas, Esq. 
Katkiss & Cir^bell 
310 South iiain 12th Floor 
SLC, Ut. 84101 
Duane A. Frandsen, Esq. 
90 West- 100 North 
Price, Utah 84501 
James 
800 Bank Bldg. 
84111 
R. C. Skeenr Esq. 
536 E. 400 So. 
SIX:, Ut. 84102 
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ATTIST: * TRUE COPY 
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UNITED STATES D6TWCT COWff 
DISTRICT Of UTAH y 
ADDENDUM "C" 
TRIAL EXHIBIT 8 DEED CREATING 
THIRD NORTH EASEMENT 
I S PUINTIFPS ] 
I I EXMjBIT 
I t O Z V O 
i Envy No — - — ~ -
ladmwmd "J \f , • 
R«d9 F**.—5.„.no. ., 
ADDENDUM "C" 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Luke G. Pappas 
SEP 21 2 w P H ' 8 2 
BOO" 220 fF Records 
rr ,7 - . j e & c c 
PRICE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, GRANTOR, of Price, 
Carbon County, Utah hereby Quit Claims to DALE L. TERRY and 
BARBARA H. TERRY, Husband and Wife, as joint tenants and not 
as tenants in common with fall rights of survivorship to the 
survivor thereof, GRANTEES, of 1290 East 300 North, Price, 
Carbon County, Utah, for the sum of TEN and NO/100 ($10.00) 
DOLLARS and such other good and valuable consideration the 
following described tract of land in Price, Carbon County, 
Utah, to-wit: 
BEGINNING at a point North 0o05'27" East 1318.27 
Feet and North 89053f47" East 1543.09 feet from 
the Southwest corner of Section 15, Township 14 
South, Range 10 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence South 5°48'43" West 30.16 feet; 
thence South 89°53'47" West 166.35 feet; thence 
North 0°06'13" West 30.00 feet to the 40 acre 
line; thence North 89°53,47" East 169.45 feet^  
to the point of beginning. 
Subject however to a reservation by the Grantors 
herein of a right of way in perpetuity over the 
North 14 feet of the above-described property, 
to be used as a public street, roadway and | 
thoroughfare, with the right to maintain, 
replace and repair said street along its present 
alignment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said PRICE CITY has caused 
its name to be signed hereto and its corporate seal to be 
affixed by ART LEE MARTINES, Mayor of Price City, on this 
'¥ day of ^Wr^ib'-z « 1982. 
PRICE CITY, A Municipal Corporation 
^ ' '"; BY: ( U . I WQYVXCV.JXZ^.^ 
ART LEE MARTINES - Mayor 
,
 fc ATTEST: * 
P. HAMPTON MCARrHUR - Citv Recorder 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Carbon ) 
— 1 J 
On this ' d-iy of ^ S J ^ J M , 1982, before me, a 
Notary Public in and for the Cou.iv/ and State aforesaid, personally 
appeared ART LEE ^ARIINLS, who being first duly sworn, did say: 
That he is the cjly elected, qualified and acting Mayor 
of Price; and, that the above and foregoirg instrument was 
signed by him on behalf of the said Price City, A Municipal 
Corporation, by auLhority of a Resolution of the City Council of 
Price on the s day of > i'/t /
 r s^> l> r ^  , 1C-2; and that said 
ART LEE MARTINES acknowledged to re that the said Price City, 
A Municipal Corporation, exocuLod sane. N 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^\ ' 
A >ly Commission Expires: 
v
c
 >y ^ y C </' 
, \x 
ADDENDUM "D" 
SECTION 2 5-5-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 AS AMENDED 
ADDENDUM "D" 
Chapter 5. Statute of Frauds 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in reaJ property. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Liases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless wntten and 
subscribed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer tor obligation of another 
When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-4. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign tor principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest In real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or 
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party crea-
ting, granung, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto author-
ized by writing. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not be 
construed to affect the power of a testator in the 
disposition of his real estate by last will and testa-
ment; nor to prevent any trust from arising or being 
extinguished by implication or operation of law. i*s3 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is 
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto auth-
orized in writing. - " - 1W3 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written 
and subscribed. 
In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or mem-
orandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed wuhin one year from the making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default 
or miscarriage of another. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking 
made upon consideration of marriage, except 
mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or 
administrator to answer in damages for the liabili-
ties, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate 
out of his own estate. 
(5) Everv agreement authorizing or employing an 
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
